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The October War between Abu Ghazaleh and Moshe Dayan: A Memory of the Six Hour War

حرب أكتوبر 73


This year we are celebrating the forty-seventh anniversary of the October 73 war, the last war the Egyptian army waged against a regular force. It was a complex and difficult war that the Egyptians fought with courage and recklessness. Much has been written about this and is still being written today. As the Egyptian side wrote novels and notes, the Israeli side also wrote, so we will post a book on each side, from Egypt a book and the weapons thrown at noon by Marshal Muhammad Abdel Halim Abu Ghazaleh, commander of the artillery during the war, and Dayan’s book confesses to Moshe Dayan, who was then Israeli Minister of Defense To show how both sides viewed the war.

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The cannons fired at noon

The book and the weapons were thrown at noon by Marshal Abu Ghazaleh during the October 73 war.
The book and the weapons were thrown at noon by Marshal Abu Ghazaleh during the October war of 73.

In 2013, the family library presented us with the book “The Cannonballed At Noon” by Major General Muhammad Abdel Halim Abu Ghazaleh. The book began with late President Anwar Sadat’s speech on artillery and its important role in October. Then he read excerpts from international newspapers, The British Times, October 16, 1973:

إقرأ أيضا:ثائر بلا قضيه

The Egyptians demonstrated the ability of their soldiers to fight … the ability of their officers to lead … and their ability to use weapons.

The book has varied its themes, as we talk about the history of cannons, from catapults to the first cannon.

War of attrition. And because the 1973 war was a restoration of the earth, it was necessary to speak of setbacks and of a duty. Abu Ghazaleh said, describing the state of the Israeli street:

The Israeli common man began to believe that victory in any war between Israel and the Arabs should always be in favor of the IDF.

إقرأ أيضا:ضربه قاضيه تقتل امثالكم

The Egyptians were frustrated by what happened, which would have been the opposite in the media.

Begin said in 1968:

The occupied Arab territories are Israeli lands that Israel has freed from illegal foreign domination.

Then he summarized the lessons learned from the defeat: ignorance of the enemy, failure to develop appropriate plans to respond to political positions, abandonment of the global political sphere to Israeli activity, ignorance of the economic, political and military potential of the Arab nation, and that the Zionist threat is directed against the entire Arab nation.

Construction, steadfastness, deterrence and liberation are the four stages of the battle for the liberation and restoration of Sinai. Construction began with the appointment of competent officers, and constancy focused on engaging in calm and equipping the defense on the canal front, and deterrence was a constant anxiety to the enemy. , and that’s what the artillery corps did.

The artillery fought many battles, which made it difficult to organize the Israeli ranks, and among the battles that took place on September 8, 1968, when a concentrated bombardment was carried out against all targets along the confrontation of the Suez Canal, and one of the results was the destruction of 101 targets.

إقرأ أيضا:أفضل أفلام رعب في العشرين سنة الماضية

After the ceasefire in 1970, Israeli leaders began to build the Bar Lev line, which was said in the book “Yom Kippur”:

The construction of the Bar Lev line cost nearly two billion Israeli pounds.

Surprise, if completed, is close to victory, and the book “Yom Kippur” which Abu Ghazaleh quoted in more than one place mentioned three errors, which are summed up in:

  • The error of Israeli intelligence, which is responsible for collecting and interpreting information on the movements of Egypt and Syria.
  • The error of the Israeli War Council, which miscalculated the situation.
  • The error made by the IDF high command based on previous erroneous estimates.

Regarding secrecy, we were able to convince the enemy that any military movement has internal and external political goals, until Moshe Dayan was convinced that the Arabs are incapable of going to war. October was chosen for its reasons, it is the month of laziness, Israelis don’t expect operations and it is crowded with Jewish religious holidays.

Artillery had its powerful role in opening up the battlefield, and this preamble of fire was accompanied by the presence of more than two thousand field guns, medium and heavy, rockets and mortars, so that the density of Egyptian fire was 175 strokes per second, the number of strokes 100,000 strokes and the weight of the Danat 3 million kg. In less than 6 hours, Egyptian forces captured more than half of the enemy’s fortified points and isolated the rest.

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Diane admits

Diane admits
Diana’s book confesses to Moshe Dayan about the October war of 73.

On the other hand, in Dian’s book, which was published by the Center for Journalism Studies, the Foundation for Cooperation in Printing and Publishing, it is a translation of Moshe’s life story. Dian.

Council President Mamdouh Reda wrote down the dialogue that took place between him and the author of the book Shawky Ibrahim, on the interest of publishing the book, and clarifying the policy of New Egypt after the Camp David agreement , and that this book is in the interest of the Egyptian reader who must always know the truth, after the victory of October, the Egyptian is no longer He is terrified of Israel and knows that he has an army capable of protecting his safety.

Dayan begins the book in 1915, his year of birth, and ends in 1975 and his return to civilian life. Dian says he joined the Haganah gangs and military-led wars until he reached leadership.

We’ll specialize in talking about what he said about the setback and the October War.

The 1967 Six Day War is the third armed conflict that Israel is waging in nineteen years, and this war was started by the bad decisions of Abdel Nasser, and the decision which was the decisive step towards war is to close the port of Eilat and not allow Israeli ships or foreign ships carrying materials to pass. A strategy to and from Israel, and announced the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel, and it has also moved more than half of the armed forces to Sinai.

Dayan says that Israel did not want war and that Nasser depended on the position of the great powers. On June 5, disaster struck. Within hours, reports from the pilots began to arrive. Hundreds of enemy planes have been destroyed on the ground and missile sites have been destroyed or rendered inoperable.

Moshe Dayan describes the Yom Kippur War and the Egyptian offensive as a surprise, and he wanted a truce to prevent war with the Egyptian side, which would make Syria hesitate before making the decision to war as it would fight on its own, but this agreement was not honored.

Dayan recalls that the losses on the Egyptian side were slight, and he wonders about the military situation and what happened to the armored vehicles, strong forces and fortified barriers on the canal, and he said in a report for the first day:

We are faced with three very difficult factors, the first of which is the size of the enemy forces equipped with weapons that have accumulated over the past few years, and the second is the anti-missile weapon after being reinforced by SAM-6 missiles. .

Diane was pessimistic and saw the difficulty of the situation, while everyone was optimistic and saw the possibility of responding immediately to the strike, and Diane continues to accurately describe the days following October 6 until it reaches the breach.

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The loophole and the end of the October war, seen from both sides

October War - Abu Ghazaleh - Moshe Dayan
The October War between Abu Ghazaleh and Moshe Dayan: A Memory of the Six Hour War.

The Israelis depend on their description of the Yom Kippur War or the victory of the October 73 war based on what happened in the breach, because it is a battle of victory for them, and because of from which Egypt agreed to a ceasefire.

Diane says:

But the affair ended with the sending of urgent telegrams by President Sadat to Nixon and Brezhnev, demanding the halt of the advance of the Israeli forces which threaten Cairo, and Sadat himself with his armed forces n couldn’t do it.

As Abu Ghazaleh described it as a fierce battle, he said:

The divide was indeed a fierce battle in which the Egyptian armed forces proved capable of teaching the Israeli enemy a lesson that will not be forgotten, and the myth that the IDF is an invincible army has come to an end.

In the end, the Egyptians were able to reclaim all of their land and defeat the region’s most powerful army, so the October War remained and will remain one of the most important wars in the world. modern era, no less important than the expulsion of the Hyksos or the expulsion of any other enemy who came to usurp part of Egyptian lands.